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INTRODUCTION
In the first issue of her opening appellate brief filed on August 8, 1994,
defendant-appellant Deanne R. Jex ("Jex") identified two plain errors committed by the trial
court in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee Paul J. Roach ("Roach"):
(1) basing summary judgment on Roach's incomplete "Statement of Undisputed Facts" — the
second page of which was never presented to the trial court; and (2) basing summary
judgment on Roach's "Statement of Undisputed Facts" which fails to contain any supporting
reference to the record.
On August 23, 1994, Roach moved the Utah Supreme Court to summarily
dismiss Jex's first issue on the grounds that it was not included in Jex's original docketing
statement and was not raised below. Jex responded that the trial court's record had not
become available for review until after her docketing statement was due. Therefore, Jex did
not learn that the trial court had improperly relied upon Roach's incomplete "Statement of
Undisputed Facts" until after her docketing statement had been filed. Jex also responded that
because both errors identified in her first issue constituted plain error by the trial court, it
was unnecessary for her to have raised that issue below. The Utah Supreme Court denied
Roach's motion for summary disposition and granted Jex an opportunity to amend her
docketing statement.17
This case was then poured-over on September 21, 1994 to this Court for
disposition. On September 23, 1994, Roach moved this Court to summarily dismiss Jex's

-

Jex amended her docketing statement on September 19, 1994.

s:\bdr\45788
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first issue once again arguing that it was not raised below. Once again, Jex responded that
because both errors identified in her first issue constituted plain error by the trial court, it
was unnecessary for her to have raised that issue below. On October 19, 1994, this Court
denied Roach's second motion for summary disposition.
On October 24, 1994, Roach filed in the trial court a Motion to Correct or
Modify the Record under Utah R. App. P. 11(h). While Roach admitted that the second
page of his "Statement of Undisputed Facts" was indeed missing from the record, he chose
not to file an affidavit attesting that the missing page was in fact filed. Instead, he took the
curious approach of shifting that burden to the trial court by arguing, "This Court simply
would not have ruled as it did had a whole page of Roach's memorandum been missing, and
therefore the documents before the Court must have been complete."-7
The trial court was apparently moved by Roach's self-serving vote of
confidence. On November 10, 1994, the trial court held, contrary to its own record, that it
now recalls having received and reviewed the second page of Roach's "Statement of
Undisputed Facts" almost two years ago.-7

A copy of Roach's Memorandum in Support of Motion To Modify Or Correct the
Record without accompanying exhibits is attached hereto as Addendum "H."
Jex opposed this motion arguing that the record speaks for itself. A copy of Jex's
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Correct or Modify the Record is attached hereto as
Addendum "I."
-'
A copy of the trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order dated November 10, 1994,
is attached hereto as Addendum "J."
s:\bdr\45788
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History having now been "corrected" by the trial court, the first plain error
identified in Jex's first issue is presumably no longer a part of this appeal. This "correction"
of the record, however, does not defeat Jex's appeal. In fact, it does not even eliminate the
first issue raised on appeal since Roach's "Statement of Undisputed Facts" remains
unsupported by any reference to the record. Therefore, this Court still has the opportunity to
show that two wrongs do not make a right.
ARGUMENT
I.

WHETHER JEX OBJECTED TO THE REMAINING ERROR IDENTIFIED IN
HER FIRST ISSUE IS IRRELEVANT SINCE IT CONSTITUTED PLAIN
ERROR.
A.

Plain Error
The Utah Supreme Court has recently discussed the three elements necessary

to establish plain error:
To establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an
alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the
following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant . . . .
State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added).^
-1

The plain error rule is also recognized in the Utah Rules of Evidence:
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence.
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party
is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a
timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific
(continued...)
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The plain error rule assumes that the error was not properly objected to below.
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether Jex objected to Roach's unsupported "Statement of
Undisputed Facts" since, as shown hereafter, it constituted plain error.
B.

An Error Exists.
Rule 4-501(2)(a) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires that the

movant's statement of material facts "shall specifically refer to those portions of the record
upon which the movant relies." Utah Code of Jud. Admin. R. 4-501(2)(a). It is undisputed
that Roach's "Statement of Undisputed Facts" does not contain a single supporting reference
to the record. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Roach because it
expressly assumed that Roach had complied with Rule 4-501(2)(a). Record ("R.") at 11.Therefore, an error exists.

-'(...continued)
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the
context . . . .

(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain
errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention
of the court.
Utah R. Evid. 103.
5/

A copy of the trial court's Memorandum Decision of April 21, 1993, which formed the basis
of its later Order and Judgment granting the requested easement, is attached to Jex's opening
appellate brief as Addendum "D."
s:\bdr\45788
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C.

The Error Should Have Been Obvious To The Trial Court.
Even a cursory review of Roach's "Statement of Undisputed Facts" by the trial

court would have revealed that it contains absolutely no supporting references to the record.
Thus, the error should have been obvious to the trial court.
D.

The Error Is Harmful.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Roach based on deemed

admissions that it made pursuant to Rule 4-501(2)(b). R. at 77. Rule 4-501(2)(b) provides
in relevant part that "[a]ll material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose
of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement."
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-501(2)(b). The emphasized language is a direct incorporation
of the requirements of Rule 4-501(2)(a).
It follows from the unambiguous language of Rule 4-501(2)(b) that unless the
movant first complies with Rule 4-501 (2)(a), then his statement of material facts cannot be
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment regardless of whether it is
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. Ironically, the trial court
misapplied Rule 4-501(2)(b) because it forgot that Roach had failed to comply with Rule 4501(2)(a). The trial court erroneously held:
In his Statement of Undisputed Facts, [Roach] has set forth sufficient facts to
establish each element [of his two causes of action]. Each factual assertion is
supported by specific reference to affidavits and deposition testimony. In
response, [Jex] has failed to adequately or competently refute any of [Roach's]
material allegations of fact establishing his right of way. Her "Statement of

s:\bdr\45788
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Facts" is wholly unsupported by any reference to the record. . . . Therefore,
pursuant to Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration, [Roach's]
assertions of fact relating to the second and fourth elements cited above must
also be deemed admitted.
R. at 77.
There are, of course, no references to affidavits in Roach's "Statement of
Undisputed Facts." R. at 23-24.^ Nor can references to deposition testimony be found
anywhere in Roach's supporting memorandum. R. at 14-24. The trial court simply did not
remember the contents of Roach's supporting memorandum.-7
Of course without the benefit of these deemed admissions, Roach would not
have prevailed on his motion for summary judgment. R. at 77. Therefore, Jex has clearly
been harmed by the trial court's plain error.
E.

Rule 4-501 Requires Complete Compliance.
Finally, there is no merit to Roach's argument that "substantial compliance"

with Rule 4-501 is adequate. The purpose of Rule 4-501 is "[t]o establish a uniform
procedure for filing motions, and supporting memoranda and documents with the court."
Utah Code Jud. Admin. Rule 4-501. Consistent with that purpose, the language of Rule 4501(2) is mandatory throughout. To allow substantial compliance would be to forgo

A copy of Roach's Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
is attached to Jex's opening appellate brief as Addendum "C."
It is for precisely this reason that Jex questions the trial court's recent "correction" of the
record. If the trial court could not remember the contents of Roach's supporting memorandum
in April 1993 (when its Memorandum Decision was entered), then how could it remember the
contents of that same document in November 1994, almost two years later?
s:\bdr\45788
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uniformity and reduce the rule to a mere practice suggestion. There is nothing in the
language of Rule 4-501 to indicate that it was intended to be a mere practice suggestion.-7
H.

ROACH'S RESPONSES CONCERNING THE ELEMENT OF REASONABLE
NECESSITY FOR THE REQUESTED EASEMENT REFLECT A COMPLETE
MISUNDERSTANDING OF JEX'S ARGUMENTS.
A.

Jex Has Not Waived Her Right To Object To Any Of The Trial Court's
Findings.
Roach contends that by specifically objecting to only the trial court's finding

regarding the reasonable necessity of the requested easement, Jex has waived the right to
object to any of the trial court's other findings. Apparently, Roach has chosen to ignore the
plain error argument presented by Jex in her first issue which challenges all of the trial
court's findings. Because the right to raise such plain error cannot be waived, Roach's
waiver argument is meritless.
B.

Roach Fails To Recognize That Jex's Arguments Regarding Roach's
Ownership Of A Leasehold Interest In The Jex Parcel Relate Only To
Roach's Inability To Establish An Easement By Implication, Not An
Easement By Necessity.
The legal fiction of an easement by implication rests on the implied intent of

the parties at the time of severance to continue a preexisting use of the servient estate.
Tschaggeny v. Union Pac. Land Resources Corp., 555 P.2d 277, 280-81 (Utah 1976); 7
David Thomas, Thompson on Real Property § 60.03(b)(5)(iii) (1994). The element of

Nor is there anything harsh about requiring a movant, such as Roach, to comply with
Rule 4-501. If a movant loses his motion for failure to comply, then he can simply bring his
motion into compliance and refile it.

s:\bdr\45788
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tecessity in this context serves as evidence of the parties' intent to continue that
lse. Id. § 60.03(b)(5)(iii).
In the present case, it cannot be disputed that when unity of title was severed
there was no immediate, reasonable necessity for the alleged preexisting use of Jex's parcel.
Roach had already procured a leasehold interest in the Jex parcel which allowed him to
traverse the Jex parcel at will. R. at 28.- ; Thus, there was no immediate, reasonable
necessity from which to imply the intent necessary to impose an easement by implication.—7
This is not say that Roach will forever be required to lease the Jex parcel in
order to access his parcel. On the contrary, if Roach could show that his parcel would
ultimately become landlocked upon the expiration of the Jex lease, then he would be entitled
to claim the benefit of another legal fiction, an easement by necessity. An easement by
necessity rests on the implied intent of the parties at the time of severance to keep the
dominant estate from becoming landlocked. Tschaggeny, 555 P.2d at 280-81; Thompson v.
Schuh, 593 P.2d 1138, 1145 (Or. 1979) ("it is primarily of the nature of an ongoing

Roach's argument that the leasehold interest would take effect only after the moment of
severance is hyper-technical. The law imposes an easement by implication in an attempt to
uphold the parties' probable intent. Here, there was no need to impose this legal fiction since
the parties' actual intent had been expressed — Roach would have the right to traverse Jex's
parcel upon severance pursuant to his lease, not pursuant to an alleged preexisting use.
Therefore, whatever immeasurable lapse of time occurred between severance and the leasehold
taking effect is irrelevant and is certainly no justification for disregarding the parties' actual
intent in favor of a legal fiction.
—
It should be noted that the imposition of an easement by implication is a very serious
matter. Unlike an easement by necessity which expires when the underlying necessity expires,
an easement by implication effects the servient estate forever. 7 David Thomas, Thompson on
Real Property § 60.03(b)(5)(iii).
s:\bdr\45788
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requirement"). Thus, if it was apparent at the time of severance that Roach might not always
hold the Jex lease (which it undoubtedly was), then Roach would be entitled to an easement
by necessity provided he could show that his parcel would otherwise become landlocked.
As is shown in the next section, however, Roach has yet to prove as a matter
of law that his parcel has ever been or will ever become landlocked.
C.

The Evidence Before The Trial Court Was Simply Insufficient To Show As
Matter Of Law That Roach Has Been Denied Permission To Bridge The
Canal.
It is undisputed that from about 1991, Roach has gained access to his parcel by

way of a bridge which he constructed across the East Bench Canal and has ceased using
Jex's parcel as a means of accessing his parcel. R. at 69. — Nevertheless, Roach argues
that by using this bridge he is a trespasser.
The only evidence that Roach offers to show he is a trespasser is the Affidavit
of J. Merrill Hallam, a representative of the East Bench Irrigation Company. R. at 3032.—' Mr. Hallam testified that to his knowledge the canal company has never given
Roach express permission to bridge the canal. Id. However, consent to enter or remain on
land "may be manifested by action or inaction" which need not be communicated to the
actor. Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 167 cmt. a (1965).

—
A copy of the Affidavit of Bryan Jex is attached to Jex's opening appellate brief as
Addendum "E."
—'
A copy of the Affidavit of J. Merrill Hallam is attached to Jex's opening appellate brief
as Addendum "G."
s:\bdr\45788
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The fact that Roach has bridged the canal and has used that bridge for the past
three years without objection from the canal company raises at least a material question of
fact concerning the canal company's implied consent. Inasmuch as a material question of
fact remains as to whether Roach has truly been denied permission to bridge the canal, the
trial court improperly granted summary judgment to Roach.
ffl.

WHETHER THE CANAL COMPANY COULD DENY ROACH PERMISSION
TO BRIDGE THE CANAL WAS CLEARLY AN ISSUE BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT.
Roach argues that whether the canal company could deny him permission to

bridge the canal was not an issue before the trial court, and therefore, cannot be raised on
appeal. Roach's argument is contradicted by the trial court's express finding that "[t]he
granting of permission to bridge the canal is obviously in the sole discretion and power of the
[canal] company." R. at 76. Apparently, the trial court believed that this issue had been
raised.—7
Unfortunately, the trial correct made the wrong finding. A canal company
does not possess unfettered discretion to deny a landowner access to his land. See Big
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah 1946). Rather, it must act
reasonably. Id.

—
The test for whether an issue will be considered on appeal has been stated as follows:
"This Court will not consider on appeal issues which were not submitted to the trial court and
concerning which the trial court did not have an opportunity to make any findings of fact or
law." Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982).
s:\bdr\45788
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The only evidence that Roach presented on this issue was testimony concerning
problems that had arisen from bridges located on other property. Absolutely no evidence
was presented as to the magnitude of these problems or that they are likely to occur on
Roach's property. Thus, there was no way for the trial court to determine whether the canal
company's alleged refusal to allow Roach to bridge the canal was reasonable even if it had
correctly understood the law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein and in Jex's opening appellate brief, the trial
court's Order and Judgment should be reversed.
DATED this 11th day of January, 1995.

(l^L<J^

(l)m V\M/Ynsy^^

Bruce D. Reemsnyder
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

PAUL J. ROACH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO CORRECT AND
MODIFY THE RECORD

vs.
DEANNE R. JEX,

Case No. 920400425
Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant.
Paul J. Roach has moved this Court to correct or modify the record that is now before
the Utah Court of Appeals in appeal 940059-CA. This Memorandum explains why that motion
should be granted.
Roach initially appeared before this Court in an action brought by him to settle the issue
of whether he had an easement to cross Deanne Jex's land. He requested that the Court find that
he had either an easement by implication or by prescription.

In support of his claim, he

submitted a Motion For Summary Judgment in which he presented affidavits and asserted that,
based upon applicable law and the fact that no material facts were in dispute, he should be
entitled as a matter of law to have an easement declared in his favor.

This Court granted his motion, stating that he had sufficiently proved the elements of
an easement by implication. See Memorandum Decision (Exhibit 1). In so concluding, the
Court specifically noticed that Deanne Jex's attempts to rebut Roach's allegations were
ineffectual. Specifically, the Court stated that she was unable to present any disputed material
facts with respect to whether Paul Roach could secure permission to enter his land across the
canal owned and operated by the East Bench Canal Company.
Roach's allegations have now become the centerpoint of Jex's appeal. She claims that
Roach made a technical oversight by failing to cite to the record or supporting affidavits in his
numbered statement of facts. Her arguments are best summarized by referring to her amended
docketing statement, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

When this amended docketing

statement was filed, Roach immediately filed a Motion For Summary Disposition contending that
the arguments surrounding the factual allegations had not been raised below and thus were
barred upon appeal. Jex responded by contending that this Court committed plain error in ruling
as it did because a page of those factual allegations was not before it. Thus, Jex concludes that
even though she did not object below to Roach's oversight, that oversight, in combination with
the fact that a page was missing from Roach's supporting memorandum, prevented this Court
from ruling as it did without committing plain error.
Roach now has moved this Court to correct or modify the record to reflect that when
the Court was considering his Motion For Summary Judgment, it had before it all the pages of
Roach's supporting memorandum. Rule 11(h) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that
2

"if any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court,
the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to
the truth." Roach submits that this Court would not have disposed of Roach's motion as it did
if material factual allegations were missing from Roach's supporting memorandum. Jex argues
otherwise, stating in her response to Roach's Motion For Summary Disposition1 that "even a
cursory reading of Roach's statement of undisputed facts by the trial court would have revealed
that it was incomplete. An entire page was missing. . . . [This] error[ ] should have been
obvious to the trial court." Appellant's Response to Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition
in Memorandum In Support of Appellant's Motion To Strike at 8 (Exhibit 3).
There is simply no basis for Jex's contention. Jex argues in her appeal that this Court
violated not only applicable rules of judicial conduct but also applicable rules of common sense
in ruling from an incomplete and nonsensical record. This Court simply would not have ruled
as it did had a whole page of Roach's memorandum been missing, and therefore the documents
before the Court must have been complete.2
1

Roach's Motion for Summary Disposition has been denied by the Court of Appeals, and the court
is now holding the appeal for plenary review.
2

Even if the page was missing from the record, this Court had the ability to discern Roach's
factual allegations and the factual bases for them by simply reading the body of the Memorandum.
Citations to the record and affidavits occur there. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment at Bates Nos. 22-13 (Exhibit C to Jex's Opposition (Exhibit 3)). This
argument-that this Court could have ruled on the record as it stands-goes beyond both Roach's
procedural objection that Jex's argument was never raised below and the current motion to have the
record corrected or modified. However, it underscores the fact that Jex's argument is spurious, and
that this Court did not commit plain error.
3

This Court should grant Roach's motion.
DATED this 2Ha

day of October, 1994.

JOHN L. VALENTINE, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this ^ f

day of October, 1994.

M. Byron Fisher, Esq.
Fabian & Clendenin
215 South State #1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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M. Byron Fisher, A1082
Bruce D. Reemsnyder, A6021
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801) 531-8900
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PAUL J. ROACH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO CORRECT OR MODIFY
THE RECORD

vs.

DEANNE R. JEX,

No. 920400425

Defendant.
Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant Deanne R. Jex ("Jex") responds to the Motion to Correct or Modify
the Record filed by plaintiff Paul J. Roach ("Roach").
Jex has appealed this Court's Order and Judgment of March 15, 1994, on
three separate grounds, only one of which is relevant to Roach's pending motion. The
relevant ground is whether this Court could grant summary judgment based upon Roach's
Statement of Undisputed Facts which failed to comply with Rule 4-501 (2)(a) of the Code of
Judicial Administration.
s:\bdr\44248

Rule 4-501 (2)(a) requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit a
statement of undisputed material facts which is: (1) complete as to all of the elements
necessary to establish his cause(s) of action and (2) supported by accurate references to the
record. CJA Rule 4-501(2)(a). The movant's statement of undisputed material facts must be
complete as to all of the necessary elements because CJA Rule 4-501 (2)(b) only permits the
trial court to deem admitted those "[1] material facts set forth in the movant's statement and
[2] properly supported by an accurate reference to the record." CJA Rule 4-501 (2)(b).i7
The record in this case reveals that Roach filed a Statement of Undisputed
material facts which set forth less than half of the material factual allegations necessary to
establish his two causes of action. Record 23-24. In fact, the record reveals that Roach
failed to file an entire page of his Statement of Undisputed Facts.-7
Despite this error, Roach now asks this Court "to correct or modify the record
to reflect that when the Court was considering his Motion for Summary Judgment, it had
before it all the pages of Roach's supporting memorandum."

The record plainly shows that

this was not the case. Roach's request that this Court now concoct a new record for his
benefit is outrageous.

For a more thorough discussion of Jex's argument under CJA Rule 4-501(2), see Appellant's Response
to Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition and Memorandum in Support of Appellant's Motion to Strike, a copy
of which is attached to Roach's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Correct and Modify the Record.
*'
Roach's Statement of Undisputed Facts contains five separately numbered paragraphs which begin with
the number 1, then jump to number 8, then proceed in sequence to number 11. Record 23-34. It is obvious from the
numbering of these paragraphs, as well as the numbering of the pages on which they appear, that the entire second page
of Roach's Statement of Undisputed Facts was never filed with this Court. Id.
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Even if this Court could honestly grant Roach's request, it would not matter.
Roach's Statement of Undisputed Facts still would not contain a single supporting reference
to the record. Thus, Roach's failure to comply with the second requirement of CJA Rule 4501(2)(a) would continue to provide a basis for reversing the Order and Judgment.
Finally, this Court should be aware that Jex has never accused this Court of
violating any rule of judicial conduct in granting Roach's motion for summary judgment.
Jex has merely argued that reversible error occurred. Roach's misstatement to the contrary
is an simply attempt to bias this Court with respect to the pending motion and, therefore,
should be ignored.
For the reasons stated herein, Roach's Motion to Correct or Modify the
Record must be denied.
DATED this S

day of November, 1994.

M. Byron Fisher
Bruce D. Reemsnyder
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 6

day of November, 1994, I caused to be

mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion to Correct or Modify the Record, to:
John L. Valentine
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84606
//c^ucx-
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAUL J. ROACH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
CASE NO. 920400425

vs.

DATE: November 10, 1994
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING

DEANNE R. JEX,
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court for consideration of Plaintiffs Motion to Correct
and Modify the Record. Having received and considered memorandum both in support and
opposition to the motion, the Court hereby grants the motion and finds as follows:
The Court finds that when it was considering Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, it had before it all the pages of Roach's supporting memorandum. Further, even
had the page been missing, the factual bases to the allegations would have been apparent to
the Court simply by reading the body of the Memorandum for Summary Judgment.
As rule 11(h) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that, "if any difference
arises as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the differnce
shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the truth."
Therefore, the Court hereby orders that the record be corrected to reflect that when the
Court reviewed the Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment in this matter, it had
before it all the pages to that document.

Dated this 10th day of November, 1994,

cc:

John L. Valentine, Esq.
M. Byron Fisher, Esq.

